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TO CATCH AN ENTRAPPER: THE 
INADEQUACY OF THE ENTRAPMENT 
DEFENSE GLOBALLY AND THE NEED TO 
REEVALUATE OUR CURRENT LEGAL 
RUBRIC  
 
Paul W. Valentine 
 
 
SECTION I 
 
Introduction 
 
 It is fair to say that a majority of us have either seen or 
been exposed to the hit television show To Catch a Predator on 
NBC.  To Catch a Predator is a series of hidden investigations by 
the television newsmagazine Dateline NBC devoted to the subject 
of identifying and detaining potential child sexual abusers who 
contact children over the internet.1  The show is important because 
those caught by the investigators oftentimes raise the entrapment 
defense, but to no avail.  Given the emergence of internet sting 
operations and covert government investigations, it is now more 
important than ever that the defense be given some credence by 
courts throughout the world.  However, recent case law and the 
general international skepticism of the defense are slowly eroding 
this important procedural protection.  
                                                 
1 For those who are not familiar with the series, here is a brief snapshot of 
how it works: Off the air, Perverted- Justice volunteers build profiles of clearly 
underage individuals on social networking websites, and enter chat rooms as 
decoys.  Would-be predators are invited to an undercover house used by Dateline 
for the duration of the operation; in accordance with Perverted-Justice policy, 
phone contact is always established with a suspected predator before any 
appointment is set up.  The visitors are led to believe that the supposed minor is 
home alone, and, upon coming inside the house, are soon confronted by host 
Chris Hanson.  At this point the individual is excoriated on hidden camera for all 
of America to see, where he is interviewed by Hanson, and eventually arrested.  
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Black’s Law Dictionary2 provides us with entrapment’s 
most cursory definition: “a law enforcement officer’s or 
government agent’s inducement of a person to commit a crime, by 
means of fraud or undue persuasion, in an attempt to later bring a 
criminal prosecution against that person.”  In the early 1900’s, 
American courts began to conceptualize entrapment as a criminal 
defense that “strikes a balance between criminal predisposition and 
overzealous law practices.”3  Courts and commentators alike have 
applied two strands of analysis to the entrapment defense: the 
subjective approach and the objective approach.  While the 
subjective approach focuses on the state of mind of the accused, 
the objective approach concentrates on the involvement of 
government agents in the commission of the crime in question.4  
This broad ideology has driven the development of the entrapment 
defense throughout the world. 
              Internationally, there is limited interest in the entrapment 
defense.5  Until very recently, the entrapment defense was 
available only in the United States; it was not a feature in English 
common law, and no other industrialized nations traditionally 
recognized it.  Entrapment’s absence from these other legal 
traditions is due partly to other devices in their legal systems for 
regulating police activity, such as outright criminal liability for 
government agents who overreach.6  A second possible factor is 
the cultural difference regarding privacy expectations, as 
Europeans seem to have a greater tolerance for more invasive 
government surveillance.7  Although some countries have begun to 
recognize the entrapment defense for the first time, they are 
generally far less judicious than U.S. courts in awarding the 
entrapment defense.8  
                                                 
2 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (8th ed. 2004).  Note that entrapment needs 
a government nexus; it cannot be committed by private actors acting privately.  
3 PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 1 (3d ed., Lexis 2002). 
4 See generally Scott C. Patton, The Government Made Me Do It: A 
Proposed Approach to Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United States 
Introduction, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 996 (1994) (discussing the development 
of the entrapment defense in the United States).  
5 Australia, for example, imposes only an exclusionary rule on evidence or 
testimony related to police overreaching. See Paul Marcus & Vicki Waye, 
Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice Systems 
Uncommonly at Odds, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 27, 73-78 (2004).  Singapore 
does not recognize the defense at all.  
6 See Jacqueline E. Ross, Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1501, 1521 (2002) (explaining that in Europe the general rule is for the 
defendant to be found guilty but for the police to be charged as accessories to the 
crime that would be analogous to entrapment situations in the U.S). 
7 Id. at 521-22. 
8 It is important to remember that most civil law countries do not recognize 
the entrapment defense.  However, in the countries that do recognize the defense, 
the majority take an objective view of it.  I have chosen to focus on some of the 
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Because there is no universal entrapment test, it has 
become especially difficult for law enforcement agents to make ex 
ante determinations about the legal consequences of their 
investigations.  According to a recent study conducted in the 
United States, entrapment claims appear to be decreasing in almost 
every state and in the federal courts from the peak years in the 
1980s and early 1990s.9  This trend leaves us more questions than 
answers.   
In the following comment, I provide a critique of the 
subjective and objective approaches to entrapment which have 
become the two approaches adopted world-wide.  Within this 
context, I discuss the inherent problems of both approaches, which 
are even more pronounced in cases of suspected terrorists. This 
comment will conclude by suggesting that every country should 
treat the entrapment defense as a due-process issue and should 
have a carefully designed order and allocation of proof in such 
trials.  
 
SECTION II 
  
The Development of the Entrapment Defense in the United States 
 
The entrapment defense in the United States has evolved 
mainly through oscillating case law.  At first, there was a genuine 
judicial distrust of the entrapment defense.10  However, courts in 
the early twentieth century began to recognize the validity of a 
doctrine that protected people from overreaching government 
investigations.  The court in Woo Wai v. United States was the first 
to officially recognize the defense.11  As entrapment jurisprudence 
                                                                                                                                                             
more well-known countries in the world.  In English law, entrapment is not a 
substantive defense because it does not automatically negate the prosecution’s 
case.  See, e.g., R v. Sang, [1980] A.C. 402 (U.K.) [hereinafter Sang].  Likewise, 
the German Federal Court of Justice has established that entrapment by 
undercover police agents is not a reason to drop the case per se. 1 STR 148/54 
(May 23, 1984). 
9 Dru Stevenson, Entrapment by Numbers, 16 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 
2-3(2005) (discussing how entrapment claims are disproportionately raised in 
California, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and 
Washington). 
10 See Board of Comm’ns v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (1864) (stating that 
the entrapment defense “has never availed to shield crime or give indemnity to 
the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code of civilized, not to say 
Christian, ethics, it never will”). 
11 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915) [hereinafter Woo].  In Woo, the defendant was 
urged by undercover immigration officers to transport Chinese immigrants into 
the United States.  Although he at first rebuffed the government’s suggestions 
that he illegally transport the immigrants, the defendant finally acted after several 
months of government persuasion.  Id. at 413.  Despite his actions, the Ninth 
Circuit eventually precluded Woo Wai from liability because they felt that “the 
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progressed throughout the twentieth century, the theoretical 
dichotomy of the defense took shape in the seminal Sorrells v. 
United States decision.12  The Hughes majority found that the 
government entrapped the defendant as a matter of law.  The court 
opined: 
“[When] the criminal design originates with the officials of 
the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent 
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense, there is a 
need for an entrapment defense.”13   
 
The court’s soaring statement “implant in the mind of an innocent 
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense” has been 
dubbed the “subjective” approach because it emphasizes the state 
of mind of the accused and allows the prosecution to defeat the 
claim by proving that the accused was independently predisposed 
to committing the crime.  The court grounded its holding in the 
supposition that Congress did not intend for criminal statutes to 
apply when the government has actively lured an innocent person 
into the commission of a crime.14  Today, the state courts or 
legislatures of 37 states have adopted the subjective test.15  States 
that have overtly espoused the subjective approach codify it by 
using language such as “predisposed” or “an otherwise unwilling 
person.”16  The factors the court will consider as proof of 
                                                                                                                                                             
suggestion of the criminal act came from the officers of the government.”   Id. at 
415.  
12 287 U.S. 435 (1932).  
13 Id. at 442.  
14 David J. Elbaz, The Troubling Entrapment Defense: How About an 
Economic Approach, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117, 124 (1999) (discussing the 
history of the entrapment defense in America).  
15 See Patton, supra note 4, at 1002, n.45.  See also Sherman v. United States, 
356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958) (Chief Justice Warren gave the most emphatic 
definition of subjective entrapment of his time by describing that a defendant is 
entrapped when “the Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party 
and beguiles him into committing crimes he otherwise would not have 
attempted.”  Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992) [hereinafter 
Jacobson] was the Supreme Court’s last major ruling on entrapment and 
reaffirmed the influence of the subjective standard in American jurisprudence.  
16 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN § 39-11-505 (1989) (This is a paradigm of a 
subjective approach. The statute provides: “It is a defense to prosecution that law 
enforcement officials, acting either directly or through an agent, induced or 
persuaded an otherwise unwilling person to commit an unlawful act when the 
person was not predisposed to do so); PA. STAT. ANN § 313 (providing “ A public 
law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an official 
perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the 
commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in 
conduct constituting such offenses by either: 1) making knowingly false 
representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; 
or 2) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial 
risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are 
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predisposition are prior acts, later acts, reputation, and eagerness. 
Although the law of evidence traditionally bars bringing into 
evidence prior acts, in cases where entrapment is used as a defense, 
the defendant has “opened the door” of his character thereby 
allowing his prior acts to be admitted.17 
Conversely, Justice Roberts, who gave little deference to 
the majority’s rationale (although in agreement with their 
substantive result) focused on the conduct of the government rather 
than the state of mind of the accused.18  According to Justice 
Roberts, the entrapment doctrine should protect society from 
government overreaching by denying convictions instigated by 
government’s own agents.19  Justice Robert’s approach has been 
dubbed the “objective” approach because it focuses on the actions 
of government agents.  Today, the minority of U.S. jurisdictions 
use the objective approach.  To eschew focusing on the state of 
mind of the accused, state statutes use language such as 
“committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it.”20  In 
effect, the objective approach focuses on the outrageousness of law 
enforcement conduct and focuses on whether a hypothetical 
reasonable law abiding citizen would be induced to commit a 
crime he would not have otherwise committed.21   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
ready to commit it); P.R. PENAL CODE ART. 31 (providing “[w]hoever commits 
an offense act, the criminal intention being induced in his mind through 
contrivance, persuasion or fraud of a public officer or by a private person acting 
in collaboration with the public officer, shall not be held liable.”).  
17 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).   
18 See Patton, supra note 4, at 999 (discussing Justice Robert’s opinion: He 
argued that the entrapment defense did not rest upon a “strained and unwarranted 
construction of . . . criminal statutes.”  Rather, it rests upon “a fundamental rule 
of public policy” which grants exclusive power to (and imposes a duty upon) a 
court to protect its own functions and preserve “the purity of its own temple.”). 
19 Id.  
20 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (1967) (providing “In any prosecution 
for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the 
proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a public 
servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, seeking to 
obtain evidence against him for purpose of criminal prosecution, and when the 
methods used to obtain such evidence were such as to create a substantial risk 
that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to 
commit it. Inducement or encouragement to commit an offense means active 
inducement or encouragement. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity 
to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.”). 
21 See Patton, supra note 4, at 1003.  
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SECTION III 
  
The Emerging Forms of the Objective Approach Overseas 
 
A. The Canadian Two-Pronged Objective Test  
 
 If Jacobson22 is the portrait of entrapment jurisprudence in 
America, R. v. Mack is its twin-brother in Canada.23  The ringing 
words of Mack have echoed in Canadian courts for nearly two 
decades because the court for the first time developed a two-
pronged test to approach the entrapment defense. The courts first 
look at if “the authorities provide a person with an opportunity to 
commit an offence without acting on a reasonable suspicion that this 
person is already engaged in criminal activity or pursuant to a bona 
fide inquiry.”24  The second inquiry occurs after the court has found 
that the police acted in the course of a bona fide inquiry, and looks to 
see if the police went beyond providing an opportunity and induce 
the commission of an offense.25  In determining whether police 
conduct goes further than providing an opportunity, a court will 
assess the following non-exhaustive list of factors: The type of 
crime being investigated, whether an average person would have 
been induced, the persistence and number of attempts made by 
police, and the type of inducement used.26  Like the objective 
approach adopted by the minority of U.S. courts, Canadian courts 
have found the state of mind of the defendant inconsequential.  In 
effect, Canada uses an expanded American objective test where the 
“reasonable person” is only one part of the inquiry.  As the Mack 
court made unequivocally clear, the conduct of the police is often 
determinative.  
 
B. The United Kingdom’s Loosely Test: A Unique Variation of the 
Objective Approach 
 
 As recently as twenty-seven years ago, the court in Sang 27 
brusquely disposed of the entrapment defense by stating that it was 
not recognized in English law.  However, Sang’s grip began to 
weaken in the following decade when the doctrine of entrapment 
                                                 
22 See Jacobson, 503 U.S. 540. 
23 R. v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903 (Can.) [hereinafter Mack].  
24 Id. ¶ 115.  For example, random virtue testing arises when a police office, 
merely looking to increase his arrest statistics, places a wallet in an obvious 
public location.   Id.  
25 Id.   See also R. v. Amato, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 418 (Can.) (the court held that 
polices’ two month request for drugs at defendant’s home and work was merely 
solicitation and did not rise to the level of inducement).  
26 Id. ¶ 133.  
27 See Sang, [1980] A.C. 402. 
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slowly developed.28  In 2000, Regina v. Loosely29 built on the 
earlier entrapment cases, and contained the most detailed 
examination of the applicable legal framework to the defense.30  
Lords Hoffman and Hutton expressly held that the predisposition 
of the defendant to commit such a crime was not a determinative 
factor, effectively rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s subjective 
approach.31  Further, they proposed certain factors to be considered 
in deciding whether the sale of heroin to undercover police officers 
constituted entrapment.  These factors included: whether the police 
had reason to suspect the accused or a particular place as being 
involved in illegal activities; the nature of the offense; the secrecy 
and difficulty of detection; the manner in which the particular 
criminal activity is carried on; and whether the undercover officers 
presented the accused with an “unexceptional opportunity to 
commit an offense.32  On this final factor, they went on to explain 
that “[u]ltimately the overall consideration is always whether the 
conduct of the police or other law enforcement agency was so 
seriously improper as to bring the administration of justice into 
dispute.”33   
 
C. The German Scalar Objective Approach 
 
Germany is one of the few civil law countries that 
recognize the entrapment defense.34  Thus, it should come as no 
surprise that their concerns with entrapment are much different 
than common-law countries.  Instead of treating the defense as a 
safe haven for individual rights, Germany treats the doctrine as one 
that encourages undercover agents to minimize their facilitation of 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., R v. Keith, [1994] 98 Cr. App. R. 437 (U.K.) (court recognized 
that defendants’ could have plausible entrapment claim with respect to tape 
recordings by undercover officers posing as contract killers); Williams and 
O’Hare v. DPP, [1994] 98 Cr. App. R. 209 (U.K.) (defendants arrested using a 
van to prepare for a robbery could be precluded from liability if the police had 
left the van for the defendants to stumble upon); Nottingham City Council v. 
Amin, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1071 (U.K.) (police officers posing as individuals could 
legally check whether taxi-drivers were properly licensed only if they conduced 
their investigations randomly). 
29 R v. Loosely, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 2060 (U.K.) [hereinafter Loosely], 
available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd011025/loose-
1.htm. 
30 This wording is taken from Dan Squires, The Problem with Entrapment, 
26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 352 (2006). 
31 Id. ¶ 22. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. ¶ 25.  
34 “Entrapment” is known in Germany as “Tatprovokation” or “Deed 
provocation.” 
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targets’ crimes.35  In other words, German courts care not about 
the person being investigated, but on the integrity of the 
investigations.  Thus, entrapment is only a mitigating factor at 
sentencing and not a defense.36  Unlike the United States, this is 
not a bi-modal or an all-or-nothing approach.  It acts as a scalar 
concept, that is, a matter of degree; the greater the government 
involvement, the greater the sentencing discount.   
                                                
 
SECTION IV 
 
The Pitfalls of Both the U.S. Subjective and International Objective 
Approaches 
 
  A. The Subjective Approach Encumbers the Defendant’s Right to 
a Fair Trial 
 
Every subjective test lacks a well-principled legal 
grounding.37  The concept of “predisposition” creates a quagmire 
in every case because it flows from no bright-line test and hinges 
on the prior acts of the defendant.  Thus, in subjective jurisdictions, 
the prosecution is relying on factors and conditions which are 
temporally separate from the criminal act for which the defendant 
stands accused.38  This thwarts not only many criminal law 
principles, but principles grounded in every legal system.39  To 
establish “predisposition,” the prosecution will, without fail, 
parade evidence of prior conduct before the jury.40   
In subjective jurisdictions, once evidence of prior conduct 
is admitted, the burden of persuasion pendulum swings heavily 
against the defendant, as he must somehow rebut the inference of 
predisposition.  In cases involving traditional victimless crimes 
 
35 See Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic 
Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 A.M.J.C.L. 
493, 557 (2007) (discussing the German entrapment doctrine). 
36 Id. at 539. 
37 For a further discussion of other disadvantages outside the scope of this 
comment see Patton, supra note 8 at 1029.  
38 Yale Law Journal Company, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: The 
Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965). 
39 See Stephen E. Leidheiser, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United 
States: Towards a More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1055, 1068 (1993).  In addition, note that it is impermissible under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, in both criminal and civil cases, to use evidence of 
particular conduct to show a greater than average propensity to commit a crime. 
FED. R. EVID. 404. 
40 See, e.g,. United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2006) where the 
prosecution was unfairly able to parade evidence of prior conduct unrelated to the 
crime at issue. If we are to take the Brand ruling seriously, the prosecution needs 
only to establish some link between the prior act and the crime at issue to satisfy 
404(B)’s requirement.   
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like drugs and alcohol, this pendulum has less momentum because 
the defendant can plausibly rebut this inference by showing that he 
has been rehabilitated.  He can do this through some type of 
tangible evidence, namely a negative test result, or a membership 
to a rehabilitation clinic.  However, in suspected terrorist cases, 
this is no simple task.  What if an individual is of a certain descent 
or his parents were (at one time) affiliated with terrorist 
organizations?  Suppose this individual is now an adult, wants to 
live the American dream and has no intent whatsoever to harm 
civilians? Is this linkage to his parents’ sufficient predisposition as 
to warrant law enforcement to entrap this individual?  Probably.  
Or, what about using a Russian scientist to sell nuclear blueprints 
to Iran (as the U.S. did in 2002) to try to entrap Iran?  Even with no 
prior acts, courts have sometimes assumed that a defendant or 
defendants(s) were already headed down an “iniquitous path.”41  
This is alarming.  Judges have considerable discretion to impart 
their personal view to decide predisposition. This is not good news 
for children now in the United States born of Middle-Eastern 
descent.  
 
B. No Matter the Variation, All Objective Approaches are Flawed 
 
 Most objective standards [as evinced by the U.S. minority 
and Canadian models] require the court to determine whether “the 
conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a 
normally law-abiding person to commit the offense.”42  In his book 
The Entrapment Defense, Paul Marcus vehemently criticizes the 
practical application of this inquiry.43  He argues that it is a 
standard that is difficult to apply because “the conceptual difficulty 
is that such reasonable individuals generally do not commit 
crimes.”44  Child pornography and suspected terrorism are 
demonstrative of the difficulty of a successful entrapment defense 
in cases of unusually abhorrent crimes.  The failure of precedent 
                                                 
41 Marreel v. Florida, 841 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (the 
court ignored the fact that law enforcement agents initiation nineteen of the 
emails and seven of the chat sessions of forty-seven total communications). 
42 See People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1979) (the court concluded that 
the proper entrapment test should ask whether “the conduct of the law 
enforcement agent is likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit 
the offense).  
43 See MARCUS, supra note 3. 
44 Id. This was also a dilemma articulated by the Alaska Supreme Court in 
Pascu v. State, 577 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1978) (holding “Since announcing our 
decision in Grossman, we have come to realize that there are probably certain 
difficulties in applying the foregoing standard.  An “average person” probably 
cannot be induced to commit a serious crime except under circumstances so 
extreme as to amount to duress.  Yet it is clear that entrapment may occur with a 
degree of inducement that falls far short of actual duress.).  
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reflects the long-term judgment of courts that no reasonable 
person, regardless of police activity, would ever engage in an act 
of child pornography, or terrorism.  In other words, if we are to 
take this seriously, objective individuals accused of these crimes 
theoretically can never prevail.  Although public policy should tip 
the scales in favor of government when there are pedophiles and 
terrorists on trial, there are inherent risks involved in giving law 
enforcement unfettered discretion to apprehend these individuals 
as they please.  
To illustrate the above point, here is an example of 
investigators acting as recruiters for a terror cell.  Their plan is to 
target individuals of Muslim descent.  The investigators hatch a 
fake plan to kill an untold number of civilians.  To recruit, they 
contact these Muslim individuals six hours a day for a span of over 
three months, constantly badgering them at work, bribing them, 
and threatening the safety of these individuals and their families.  
Eventually, after several months, some succumb and commence 
training.  Upon arrest, they predictably raise an entrapment 
defense. In an objective jurisdiction (New York, for example), it is 
uncertain that these Muslim men who underwent months of 
badgering will have a viable defense 
At this point, it is necessary to evaluate the merits of the 
hypothetical vis à vis some of the objective jurisdictions discussed 
thus far.  In the United States, no judge would find that a 
“reasonable law abiding citizen,” would ever engage in terrorist 
activities, as no level of government inducement justifies yielding 
to such a temptation.  In the United Kingdom, the type of crime 
being investigated [one of the factors from Loosely] would work 
heavily against the defendant.  Furthermore, the court would likely 
state that the defendant was not presented with an “unexceptional 
opportunity” because the law enforcement agents conducted their 
investigations through an intermediary, the telephone, and the 
defendants always had the option to simply hang up.  In Germany, 
the court would consider the difficulty in detection of terrorism and 
would give great deference to law enforcement agents.  At best, the 
defendants would have a mitigated punishment.  Australia and 
Singapore and many other nations would give absolutely no 
credence to this defense whatsoever.  Does this seem fair?45 In 
                                                 
45 Worse yet, this problem is compounded because of the procedure raising 
and adjudicating the defense.  In most of these jurisdictions, an entrapment claim 
is frequently presented to the court with no jury, as it is decided as a matter of 
law.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (objective test and issue 
determined by the court); People v. Roy, 265 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) 
(objective entrapment is a legal question for the trial court); State v. Pfister, 264 
N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1978) (objective entrapment presents a jury question if there is 
a factual dispute).  In contrast, where the entrapment is based on the defendant’s 
lack of predisposition, the issue is typically raised at trial, and the issue is one for 
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essence, the objective approach is leading to the erosion of the 
doctrine because courts throughout the world are only providing 
defendants who commit the less serious crimes an escape hatch.  
 
SECTION VI 
 
 A Due Process Approach to Entrapment 
 
A. A Due- Process Approach 
 
Applying a due process standard to the entrapment defense 
is admittedly something that is not entirely new.  Paul Marcus in 
his 2002 book, The Entrapment Defense, allocates an entire 
chapter, dubbed The Future of Entrapment, to explain that due 
process will be more easily accepted and commonly made in cases 
of entrapment.46  Even prior to this, over thirty years ago in United 
States v. Russell, the court noted “[we] may some day find a case 
in which the conduct of law enforcement is so outrageous that due 
process principles would absolutely bar the government from 
invoking judicial proceedings.”47  That day has come.  
A due-process approach would also provide a better means 
of deterrence. At present, the problem with using the entrapment 
defense to deter misconduct is simply put as follows: it may be 
only a small discomfort to the cop that the defendant goes free.48  
There is no reason to assume that the type of cop who would 
engage in an illegitimate sting operation is the sort who would be 
troubled by the defendant going free; in fact, the opposite seems 
more likely to be the case.49  Normally, when we adopt a policy of 
deterrence, policymakers use more direct methods: sanction 
attached to the forbidden behavior.50  This is not the case with the 
entrapment defense.  The supposed sanction, or unpleasant 
consequence, comes not in the form of direct harm to the bad cop, 
but indirectly, as a (possibly) undeserved benefit to a third party, 
the defendant.51  Furthermore, entrapment is not a constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                             
the jury.  See, e.g., State v. Stanley, 597 P.2d 998 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (adopts 
subjective test; entrapment established as a matter of law only when evidence of 
lack of predisposition is undisputed); Chambers v. State, 269 S.E.2d 42 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1980) (adopts subjective test; conflict in defendant’s and state’s evidence 
presented a jury question). 
46 See also Farley v. State, 848 So. 2d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (the 
court used due process language to make its decision). 
47 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
48 Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and the Problem of Deterring Police 
Misconduct, 37 CONN. L. REV. 67 (2004) (discussing the inadequacy of 
entrapment as a deterrent). 
49 Id at. 78.  
50 Id. at 76. 
51 Id.  
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defense, unlike the exclusionary rules, and therefore does not 
trigger the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine; this allows even 
conscientious police to risk a successful entrapment defense being 
raised by the accused, if there is the potential for “greater payoffs” 
in the form of discovering evidence of other crimes, deterring 
members of a criminal conspiracy, or incriminating third parties.52 
It would be more effective and efficient to deter improper 
police conduct through a sanction placed directly on the officers.  
Section 1983 actions may be more likely to influence individual 
decisions than an indirect deterrence.53  This type of deterrence 
works as a perfect complement to a due process approach because 
it would not deter the “good” law enforcement agents from 
zealously investigating.  To offend due process is no simple task.  
The conduct of the police officer must be “so outrageous and 
prejudicial to offend due process.”  Officers who enforce the law 
properly will not cross this high threshold.  In other words, only 
the officers who deserve to be punished will be. 
  
B. A Specified Order and Allocation of Proof  
 
 Much like employment discrimination claims in the United 
States, the process of evaluating the merits of an entrapment 
defense should include a defined order and allocation of proof.  I 
suggest that this be a three-step test.  The first step would require 
the person claiming entrapment to make a prima facie case by 
showing that but for the involvement of law enforcement, the 
crime would not have been committed in the exact circumstance it 
was committed.  Put another way, it must be shown that if the 
police or government were in no way involved, the crime would 
not have been committed in the exact manner (e.g. same place, 
same time, and same participants) it was committed.  Here, the 
claimant would have the burden of persuasion.  This would not be 
a difficult burden to overcome, but is important that this is satisfied 
so as not to create a windfall of cases against the government.   
Following this, the burden would shift to the investigator(s) 
to produce evidence that this investigation was a) legitimate, b) 
there were few, if any, alternatives, and c) that the decision was 
made in good faith. This step would evaluate the outrageousness 
of the government conduct. Subsequently, the government would 
have the burden of production, which would require the 
                                                 
52 Id.                                                                                                                                                                            
53 Some commentators see personalized civil actions against officers as the 
answer to the problems with the exclusionary rule. For a discussion, see Jeffrey 
Standen, The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic Comparison of 
Private Remedies for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
1443 (2000).  
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government to bring forth evidence of the type of crime being 
investigated, the difficulty of detection, other means available, and 
other mitigating factors.  This second step resembles the objective 
theories we have seen in the U.S. minority and some international 
jurisdictions.  If this were the standard, the defendants that were 
put behind bars in my hypothetical would prevail because of this 
step; it would be impossible for the government to legitimately 
argue that their incessant phone calls were made in good faith.  
If the government satisfies this step, the court would 
proceed to the final inquiry, where the claimant still has the burden 
of persuasion.  Here, the defendant would have to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that considering the totality of the circumstances, 
convicting him of the crime that was created by the government 
would shock the judicial conscience.  Although this resembles the 
U.S. subjective test, there is a caveat embedded within: 
predisposition is not dispositive; it is only part of the inquiry.  
Public policy weighs in favor of this strict “shocking the 
conscience” test because we generally want to prevent crimes from 
happening.  However, by considering the totality of the 
circumstances, defendants will not be unduly burdened by a single 
prior act, their heritage, or other factors that would normally weigh 
heavily in favor of a predisposition.  
 
 
SECTION VII 
 
Conclusion 
 Terrorism and its related crimes are without question 
despicable offenses.  However, we should not as a society abandon 
our legal morals when investigating these crimes because, as is 
often the case, some individuals who are apprehended are coaxed 
into the committing the crime in the first place.  At present, the two 
competing approaches to entrapment worldwide have left the 
defense in flux.  With the increasing popularity of the internet and 
technologically advanced surveillance tactics, anti-terrorism and 
To Catch a Predator-type investigations will inevitably arise 
everywhere. While a due process approach is not the ultimate 
panacea, it is the complete overhaul of the defense that we have 
needed.  Every country on our planet should view entrapment 
uniformly as a due process issue because it avoids the difficulty of 
predisposition, and the injustices created by the hypothetical 
reasonable person.  Retributionists and utilitarians alike would 
support a due process approach.  
Internet blogs and websites are currently littered with 
debates over the entrapment issue, and the end is seemingly 
nowhere in sight.  I ask readers this: The next time you are with 
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acquaintances to watch the To Catch a Predator series, or hear 
how a suspected terrorist is apprehended, I hope you see the 
investigations from a new perspective and are, at the very least, 
more skeptical about the validity of some of them.  The fact is that 
technology and entrapment are not mutually exclusive.  
Antiterrorism, child pornography, and the like are national 
priorities and highly technical undercover sting operations are a 
main tool to combat them.  As our legal system’s primary device 
for regulating undercover stings, the scope and vigor of the 
entrapment defense could impact all of our individual liberties.  
 
